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1 Introduction
The search for progress on a global regime for
the promotion of Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
was a major focus of the December 2010 COP16
summit in Cancun, Mexico.1 This summit also
saw Brazil building on the leadership role it has
increasingly assumed in debates on the links
between deforestation and climate change.
Globally, the LULUCF (land use, land use change
and forestry) category of activities accounts for
17.4 per cent of annual greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions (IPCC 2007). In Brazil, which is
currently the world’s fourth-largest GHG emitter,
this category accounts for up to 55 per cent of the
country’s annual emissions, with the inclusion of
agriculture bringing the total to around 80 per
cent (McKinsey & Company 2009).
To date, most international attention has been
focused on the Amazon region of Brazil. This
region not only includes over half of the world’s
largest rainforest, but is also home to a number
of highly active social movements who claim to
speak for the indigenous peoples and other
forest-dwellers who have been resisting the road-
and dam-building, logging, mining, smallholder
resettlement and cattle-ranching that by 2007
had driven the destruction of over 18 per cent of
the original forest cover of the Brazilian Amazon
(Fearnside 2008).
Indigenous territories cover over one-fifth of
Brazilian Amazonia (some 220 million hectares
of forest), and 25.3 per cent of the total territory
of the Amazon (Rojas Garzón 2009). They have
been shown to be the most effective category of
protected area in reducing deforestation – with
an impact significantly greater than that of
indirect-use conservation areas such as national
parks (Nelson and Chomitz 2009). As the
national regulatory framework for REDD+ and
the national policy on the management of
indigenous territories (the Política Nacional de
Gestão Ambiental em Terras Indígenas or
PNGATI) are still being debated, Brazil’s
Amazonian indigenous groups have found
themselves facing increasingly intense interest in
their lands from private sector ‘carbon cowboys’
(Harvey 2007) and mainstream environmental
NGOs alike.
The emerging Brazilian regulatory framework
for REDD+ has been influenced by four parallel
and potentially conflicting initiatives:
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z A consultation exercise led by the federal
Environment Ministry;
z The development of sub-national regulatory
frameworks by states in the Amazon 
region;
z The introduction of a ‘REDD Certification’
bill in Congress;
z A civil society effort to establish principles and
criteria for ‘socioenvironmental’ safeguards in
REDD+ initiatives.
Each was driven by a distinct constellation of
actors and interests, espousing a range of
different and often contradictory ideological
standpoints (see Tanner and Allouche, this IDS
Bulletin). Despite the extent of these differences,
however, by December 2010, they had given way
to apparent agreement on a way forward for
regulating REDD+ in Brazil.
The article highlights the particular challenges
posed by the implementation of REDD+
initiatives in indigenous territories. It focuses on
the actors, ideologies and interests influencing
these processes, and interrogates the extent to
which their convergence has resolved underlying
tensions. Following Bruno Latour, it asks
whether or not the ‘war of the worlds’ over
REDD+ in Brazil has evolved into a new phase
of constructive engagement between holders of
different worldviews – or whether it has merely
perpetuated the illusion that this engagement is
not really necessary, since ‘when disputes occur,
we need only to increase the relative share of
scientific objectivity, technical efficiency,
economic profitability and democratic debate,
and the disputes will soon cease’ (Latour 2002:
7). In exploring these tensions, it highlights the
strategic significance of one of the most vexed
issues in global debates on REDD+, the
relationship between market-based approaches
and the rights of indigenous peoples.
2 REDD in Brazil: actors and ideologies
The fieldwork for this case study was carried out
between September and December 2010, and
included key informant interviews, a stakeholder
workshop and participant observation in civil
society and government-sponsored REDD+
discussion events in Brasília and Amazonas, as
well as analysis of policy documents and other
texts. This included the construction of a
Stakeholder Matrix (Holland 2007) with a group
of workshop participants from Brazilian and
international NGOs, bilateral donor agencies
and Amazonian social movements.
The main groups of actors identified as engaging
in REDD+ debates in Brazil, although with
varying levels of involvement, power and
influence, were those associated with the Federal
Government, sub-national governments,
agribusiness and other economic interests,
bilateral and multilateral donor and lending
agencies, large international NGOs (or
‘INGOs’), Brazilian environmental NGOs,
indigenous movement organisations and other
social movements. The research showed that
positions within each of these groupings are
heterogeneous and often highly contested, with
struggles for control of the agenda driven both by
competition for power and resources and by
ideological differences. Applying the stakeholder
matrix methodology to a specific issue (in the
case of the workshop discussion, the marketing
of carbon credits deriving from REDD+
activities in indigenous territories) makes it
possible to identify some of the key faultlines.
Brazil’s position in international negotiations has
long been wary of market-based approaches,
favouring intergovernmental arrangements such
as the 2008 agreement with Norway, under which
it established a billion-dollar ‘Amazon Fund’ to
support REDD+ and ‘REDD-readiness’ activities.
However, over the last 2–3 years this position has
shifted as different perspectives within the
Federal Government have come to the fore. Our
research suggests that both the indigenous affairs
agency FUNAI and the long-engaged Ministry of
Science and Technology and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs remained sceptical of market-based
REDD+ initiatives, especially when these
affected sensitive areas such as indigenous
territories. The powerful President’s Office was
broadly neutral and the Environment Ministry,
which has come to play an increasingly central
role in both national climate change policy and
intergovernmental negotiations, was also less
hostile to market-based REDD+ approaches.2
Among the sub-national governments, the
Amazonian states had clearly taken the lead in
debates on REDD, attempting to work out a
common policy position through the Legal
Amazon Governors’ Forum.3 In June 2009, this
forum issued a strong statement, known as the
‘Palmas Declaration’, which interviewees
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credited with shifting the federal government
away from its initial position of blanket hostility
to market-based mechanisms ahead of the
Copenhagen COP15 summit.4 Despite such
displays of unity, however, Amazonian state
governments have espoused very different
approaches to REDD+. These range from the
ambivalence of the agribusiness-dominated
government of Mato Grosso, to the aggressive
pursuit of private-sector partnerships by the
business-friendly government of Amazonas, to
the attempt to build a participatory forest
management model by the social movement-
aligned government of Acre.
Among the environmentalist INGOs, the
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) appears as
the most cautious and The Nature Conservancy
(TNC) as the most strongly market-focused.
Indigenous organisations were shown to be
deeply divided, with apex organisations like
COIAB (the coordinating body for indigenous
movement organisations in the Amazon region)
and APIB (the national indigenous movement
body) struggling to arrive at a common position,
while different leaders among their grassroots
constituencies formed alliances with pro-REDD
or anti-REDD NGOs, or found themselves
engaging directly with the carbon market. Some
groups claimed to be managing this engagement
successfully (e.g. the Paiter-Suruí in the Western
Amazonian state of Rondônia), but other
indigenous leaders interviewed during the
research spoke of perplexity, alarm and intra-
community conflict resulting from contacts with
outsiders promising carbon market cash for
REDD+ activities.5 Many of these outsiders were
reputable environmental NGOs, but there were
also several reports of indigenous leaders
receiving unsolicited contact from private sector
‘carbon cowboys’.
The Brazilian NGOs cited by key informants had
an even wider range of positions in relation to the
regulation of carbon credits deriving from REDD+
activities in indigenous territories. Some (such as
IDESAM and FUNBIO) are actively engaged in
mediating relationships with Brazilian and
international corporate purchasers of compulsory
or voluntary offsets. Others (such as ISA, IPAM
and IMAFLORA) have been promoting
‘socioenvironmental’ safeguards but are broadly in
favour of forest-dwelling communities engaging
with the carbon market. A further group
(including CTI and IEB)6 have longstanding
engagements with indigenous groups who are now
exploring REDD+ opportunities, but are more
hesitant about market-based approaches, while a
final group (including rights-based NGOs linked to
the MST or Landless Rural Workers’ Movement
and CIMI, the indigenous affairs agency of the
Catholic Church) are viscerally opposed to such
approaches.
The ideological reference points for these diverse
actors echo many of those that have already been
identified at the global level, with a
predominance of ‘social green’ worldviews
(Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Hiraldo and Tanner,
this IDS Bulletin; Peskett and Brockhaus 2009).
In addition, however, our detailed analysis of the
Brazilian ideological and discursive environment
since mid-2009 has highlighted the importance
of a further perspective, which we will call
‘socioculturalist’.7
This perspective is underpinned by a conviction
that, as the October 2009 Belém Declaration put
it, ‘markets are not the spaces capable of taking
responsibility for life on this planet’ (Amigos da
Terra et al. 2009: 1). This Declaration signals
that while there may be significant ideological
factors underpinning other standpoints (such as
a preoccupation with national sovereignty or a
belief in the primacy of environmental
preservation over human development), the
‘socioculturalist’ perspective is the only one of
these whose challenge for REDD regulation has
an ontological basis. As Bruno Latour points out,
the Western modernist tradition, to which
advocates of ‘technical’ and ‘market-based’
solutions to climate change belong, presents
market forces as ‘the natural bedrock of all
humanity since the beginning of time, as the
fundamental logic to which everyone should
submit without discussion in order to enjoy the
benefits of wealth and freedom’ (Latour 2002:
48). For the signatories of the Belém
Declaration, however, market mechanisms are a
set of culturally and historically specific
constructs that serve particular political and
economic interests and have no claim to
represent a ‘fundamental logic’ for humanity.
This Declaration was issued by a group of social
movement organisations, labour unions and
human rights NGOs, many of them linked to the
Catholic Church and/or the Workers’ Party (PT),
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who met in the Amazonian city of Belém in the
run-up to the Copenhagen COP15 meeting.
They insisted that the participation of Brazil in
international negotiations should not focus on
REDD+ or any other (fully or partially) market-
based instrument, but rather should emphasise
the need for transition to a new model of
production, distribution and consumption, based
on agroecological principles, cooperatives, fair
trade, energy diversification, biosafety and food
sovereignty. This ‘socioculturalist’ perspective is
driven and legitimated by Brazilian actors such
as the MST, both domestically and within
international coalitions such as the peasant
movement organisation Via Campesina, which
articulated the most significant anti-REDD
protests in Cancun.
‘Socioculturalist’ ideology was given a strong
platform at the ‘World Peoples’ Conference on
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth’
in Cochabamba in April 2010. The Cochabamba
‘Peoples’ Agreement’ rejected ‘market
mechanisms such as REDD… which are violating
the sovereignty of peoples and their right to prior
free and informed consent as well as the
sovereignty of national States, the customs of
Peoples, and the Rights of Nature’ (CMPCC
2010). The Cochabamba meeting placed particular
emphasis on ‘the knowledge, wisdom, and
ancestral practices of Indigenous Peoples, which
are affirmed in the thought and practices of
‘Living Well’, recognizing Mother Earth as a living
being with which we have an indivisible,
interdependent, complementary and spiritual
relationship’ as the reference point for its rejection
of market-based responses to climate change.
A few months before the Cancun summit, the
divergences outlined above seemed irreconcilable.
In particular, the ‘socioculturalist’ standpoint
seemed to be firmly tied to a radical rejection of
REDD – which could prove fatally damaging to its
viability, given the wide range of Amazonian
forest-dwellers’ social movements represented
among the signatories of the Belém Declaration.
However, the view that rejection of market-based
approaches was not merely ideological but actually
ontological once one subscribed to ‘indigenous
values’ was not necessarily shared by the political
representatives of the original holders of those
values. Although the indigenous peoples of the
Brazilian Amazon have long acquired an
emblematic status for socioculturalists and for the
global green movement as a whole (at least since
the rock star Sting first took the Kayapó leader
Raoni on tour two decades ago), no Brazilian
indigenous organisations signed either the Belém
Declaration or the Cochabamba ‘Peoples’
Agreement’. It seems that their leaders did not
find that ‘indigenous values’ automatically
debarred them from engaging in REDD+
activities – though the terms of that engagement
would certainly need to be carefully negotiated.
3 Regulating REDD in Brazil: towards
convergence?
Brazilian debates on REDD have been shaped by
the country’s specific ideological and political
dynamics, rather than simply reproducing global
positions. Nevertheless, the influence of global
policy processes can clearly be seen when we
analyse the trajectories of different Brazilian
initiatives on REDD+ regulation. Timelines
highlighting key events and processes (identified
through key informant interviews and the
stakeholder workshop) were produced by this
research in each of the domains: civil society,
sub-national governments, the federal
government and the national legislature. These
showed a heavy clustering of significant events in
the months preceding the COPs in Copenhagen
(December 2009) and Cancun (December 2010),
and key informants concurred that the need to
take an agreed position to these global fora was a
powerful driver for domestic negotiations. In this
section, we describe how these negotiations led
to convergence both within and across the four
domains of action identified in the Brazilian
debate over REDD regulation.
In the sub-national domain, the state of
Amazonas initially made the running, passing a
State Climate Change Policy into law in June
2007. Multiple REDD-related programmes
reflecting business-friendly approach have since
emerged, including the Bolsa Floresta
programme (a system of cash transfers tied to
forest protection that is co-funded by the state
government with Brazilian and international
businesses) and enabling legislation for a new
kind of protected area, the Private Sustainable
Development Reserve, which would be eligible
for REDD+ funding. The State of Acre, which
has been governed by the Workers’ Party since
1998 and whose government has developed a
virtually symbiotic relationship with forest
peoples’ movements (Shankland 2010a), has
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recently become more influential, not least by
successfully positioning itself as a key partner of
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Californian
administration within the international
Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force
(GCF). Following a participatory process that
marked a clear distinction between its approach
and that of Amazonas, the Acre state
government carried out extensive consultations
before establishing a sub-national regulatory
framework for climate change policy based on a
REDD-friendly system of incentives for
preserving ecosystem services in October 2010.
While pursing their own distinctive agendas, the
different states used the Legal Amazon
Governors’ Forum to work out a common
platform for engaging with the Brazilian federal
government on REDD, successfully pressing
President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva to set up a
task force to review the country’s negotiating
position ahead of the Copenhagen COP15
summit. This task force concluded by
recommending a more positive approach to
market-based financing of REDD+ activities, as
urged by the Amazonian governors in their
‘Macapá Declaration’ of October 2009.
Significantly, it also favoured the remuneration
not only of ‘flows’ of reduced deforestation
(which appealed to Mato Grosso and other states
with high rates of forest destruction), but also of
‘stocks’ of standing natural forests, which
favoured states with most of their rainforest still
intact – above all Amazonas, which by 2007 had
lost less than 2 per cent of its original forest
cover, against 13 per cent for Acre and over
37 per cent for Mato Grosso (Fearnside 2008).
The influence of Amazonas state has also been
evident within the federal legislative domain, in
particular through the influence of the state’s
leading REDD advocate Virgílio Vianna (a former
Secretary for Sustainable Development in the
state government who heads the mixed public-
private ‘Sustainable Amazonas Foundation’). In
July 2009, Lupércio Ramos, a Federal Deputy from
Amazonas, introduced a ‘REDD Certification’ bill
in Congress. The bill initially made little progress
as it was seen as favouring an excessively narrow
group of (private) interests. However, at Virgílio
Vianna’s suggestion, another Federal Deputy from
Amazonas, Rebecca Garcia, took responsibility for
steering the bill through the Environment and
Sustainable Development Committee of the lower
house of Congress in December 2009, and
immediately set about building a broader base of
support for it. Over the course of 2010, her office
organised a total of 43 discussion meetings and
consultations with key actors ranging from federal
government representatives to social movements
to carbon-market players. The federal government
remained suspicious of the bill, and initially
blocked it when it came up for approval in the
Environment and Sustainable Development
Committee in November 2010. However, this
proved only a temporary setback. When the
government referred the bill to the Environment
Ministry, the latter was able to mobilise a rapid
response from the chairs of three working parties
that had been set up to discuss key aspects of a
future national regulatory framework for REDD+.
This, in turn, allowed for revisions to be made to
the text of the bill in time for it to pass through
the Committee stage before the end of the
legislature’s term in December 2010.
The Environment Ministry had belatedly
established these working parties in July 2010
after a long period in which it devoted more
attention to biodiversity and left the more
REDD-sceptical Ministry of Science and
Technology to lead on climate change policy.
They had a mixed government, private-sector
and civil society membership; all three were
chaired by climate change specialists who were
independent of the federal government, and
although they were convened by the Ministry,
their status was not formalised, which meant
that their recommendations were non-binding.
This lack of formalisation and the rushed
schedule for the groups’ deliberations generated
some tensions, particularly over the participation
and representation of grassroots interests. It was
not until November that some members of
indigenous and other forest-dwellers’ social
movements were able to take part in one of the
consultation meetings, where they demanded
that additional resources be made available to
broaden engagement. Despite these demands,
the working parties’ cycle of meetings was wound
up as scheduled in late November, with the result
that when their chairs were asked to provide
suggestions for revision of the bill being steered
through Congress by Rebecca Garcia, they had
to resort to consulting group members by e-mail
– a mechanism not well suited to securing
extensive participation from grassroots members
of forest-dwellers’ movements.
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As it happens, a consultative process with a much
broader-based approach to participation had
already been undertaken by a coalition of civil
society groups between December 2009 and April
2010. This was the effort, facilitated by a group
of Brazilian NGOs and funded by the Packard
Foundation, to construct ‘Socioenvironmental
Principles and Criteria for REDD+ projects in
the Brazilian Amazon’, which included large-
scale meetings for representatives of indigenous
and non-indigenous forest-dwellers’ movement
organisations in the major Amazonian cities of
Manaus, Porto Velho and Belém, as well as
consultations with farmers in the state of Mato
Grosso and with private-sector interests in São
Paulo. What marked this ‘Principles and
Criteria’ process out as distinctive was the effort
that was put into ensuring that the development
of recommended safeguards by a multi-
stakeholder committee was matched by
extensive consultation. This allowed the
facilitators of the process to claim that the more
than 150 representatives of indigenous groups
and other rainforest residents and users who
took part in the meetings ‘were not simply
consulted during the process, but were mainly
responsible for the construction of the document,
which has strengthened its legitimacy and their
sense of ownership of it’ (Voivodic et al. 2010: 15).
This participation was orchestrated by the joint
NGO-social movement ‘Amazon Working Group’
(GTA) and other social movement umbrella
groups – including several who had been
signatories to the ‘Belém Declaration’ that
rejected REDD outright in October 2009.
Although some of these groups continued to
voice deep suspicion, the ‘Principles and Criteria’
process was highly effective in shifting the terms
of the debate. Most of the social movement
leaders on whom the anti-REDD campaign
depended for its legitimacy, realised during the
consultation process that they could not afford to
exclude themselves from this potentially
significant source of resources and political
leverage, and shifted their focus to discussing the
conditions that would need to be fulfilled before
REDD projects could go ahead. In effect, the
‘socioculturalist’ attack on the legitimacy of
REDD was blunted by turning an argument
about values into one about safeguards. The
‘Principles and Criteria’ process had promoted
broad-based engagement with representatives of
groups whose perspectives had seemed to pose a
fundamental challenge to the assumptions
underpinning REDD – but in Latour’s terms, by
excluding the ontological component of these
perspectives, the process ensured that debates
‘affected representations, but they never touched
the substance, the very fabric of the world’
(Latour 2002: 17).
The ‘Principles and Criteria’ consultation was
able to secure an unusual level of national
legitimacy and visibility for a civil society-led
(and foreign-funded) process in Brazil. This was
reflected in the fact that its final product was
explicitly picked up by actors engaged in the
parallel processes that were being led by sub-
national governments, the Environment Ministry
and Congress. In the event, Rebecca Garcia’s bill
was to incorporate many of the key points from
the ‘Principles and Criteria’ safeguard
recommendations, inserted by the federal
government on the advice of the Environment
Ministry’s working parties – many of whose key
members had been closely involved both in the
‘Principles and Criteria’ process and in various
sub-national government initiatives.
The convergence of four initially parallel
processes in the domains of sub-national
government, Congress, the federal government
and civil society was thus a coming-together of
people, as well as of interests and – apparently –
of ideologies. In effect, policy was being shaped
by an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas 1992) that
had incorporated elements of what we have
called the ‘socioculturalist’ standpoint – a
convergence that had been made possible by
downgrading the socioculturalist challenge from
a fundamental question of ontology to a
negotiable question of safeguards.
4 Forest governance, indigenous peoples and
REDD: challenges for implementation
By late 2010, the struggles over REDD+
regulation in Brazil had arrived at a point of
convergence sufficient to underpin a broad
legislative framework. The bill was able to make
progress because it took a ‘something for
everyone’ approach to REDD+ (permitting
revenues to flow to federal and state governments,
high-deforestation and low-deforestation regions,
private landowners and protected-area residents,
indigenous communities and soya barons), while
at the same time, including safeguards to allay
the fears of forest-dwellers and their
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‘socioculturalist’ allies. The classic political
economy question of ‘who gets what, when and
how’ remains unanswered in relation to the
precise mechanisms for sharing out REDD+
revenues. Similarly, the interpretation and
enforcement of the safeguards promised in the
negotiating text is likely to be the focus of
continuing struggles as the Brazilian National
REDD Regime progresses through regulatory
definition and into implementation.
In these struggles, the stakes are high for
indigenous people in Brazilian Amazonia. As we
noted above, even the current small-scale REDD
initiatives, most of which draw on the voluntary
market, have generated concern and confusion
among many indigenous groups, particularly
those who have been targeted by ‘carbon
cowboys’. This situation is likely to worsen, as
interest from carbon-market actors continues to
intensify while what may be protracted
discussions go on over the legal basis and
regulatory framework for generation and trading
of carbon credits in the region, leaving a cloud of
legal uncertainty hanging over these kinds of
projects. May and Millikan point out in a recent
review of the policy context for REDD+ in Brazil
that ‘indigenous territories lie on lands under the
control of the Union, from which the marketing
of environmental services remains uncertain in
terms of remuneration’ (May and Millikan 2010:
xi). Resolving this uncertainty will depend on the
final outcome not only of the National REDD
Regime process but also of the parallel initiative
to define the national policy on the management
of indigenous territories (PNGATI), which falls
under the remit of FUNAI, the REDD-sceptical
federal indigenous affairs agency.
Even with a clear and comprehensive legal
framework in place, however, risks will remain.
REDD+ initiatives may simply reinforce existing
power configurations, through top-down design and
implementation of projects in which state and
private actors (federal and state agencies, local
governments and international and national
NGOs) capture the greater part of benefits from
payments for environmental services at the
expense of indigenous peoples and other forest
communities. Brazil has robust Constitutional
indigenous rights provisions and recognises
international legal instruments like International
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 that
guarantees the right of indigenous peoples to free,
prior and informed consent, one of the key
safeguards endorsed by the ‘Principles and
Criteria’ process. Nevertheless, the country already
stands accused of riding roughshod over this in
order to push through ‘national priority’
infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams.
Powerful economic and political interests may be
able to claim the same ‘national priority’ status for
REDD+ initiatives that undermine the land and
livelihood rights of indigenous peoples, for example
where private landowners contest their land claims
or where there are overlaps between indigenous
territories and state or federal protected areas
(Rojas Garzón 2009). Even if the federal
government is strongly committed to upholding
indigenous rights claims, sub-national actors (many
of them explicitly hostile to indigenous interests)
may be able to take precedence. As Toni (2010)
points out, Brazilian forestry and conservation
policies have been undergoing a slow and steady
decentralisation process and – as our discussion of
state-level initiatives has indicated – this trend is
likely to accelerate as REDD+ activities grow in
importance.
While these issues have been widely discussed in
the literature, one further key risk has not yet
received sufficient attention. This is the prospect
that future arrangements for the governance of
REDD+ initiatives affecting indigenous
territories will be unsuccessful because they
simply fail to connect with the realities of
indigenous resource management and political
decision-making. The underlying logic of REDD is
Western contract-based exchange: when
payments are made to support forest protection
on indigenous lands, a service is being purchased.
Such an exchange assumes that a negotiation has
taken place, that its object is clear to those
involved and that legitimate agency is being
exercised by those doing the negotiating –
otherwise it cannot be considered binding. Yet, if
Bruno Latour is correct, the ontological basis of
indigenous peoples’ relationships with the forest is
radically different from that assumed by the
Western promoters of REDD. In other words,
where the ‘ecosystem services’ that are on the
table are defined by what Latour calls ‘Western
scientific mononaturalism’ and have no equivalent
category within indigenous conceptualisations of
nature, it is by no means certain that both parties
are in agreement on the object of their
negotiations.8 Furthermore, indigenous political
culture does not necessarily sanction delegated
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authority of the kind that operates in Western
political or commercial negotiations (Shankland
2010b). Indigenous leaders interviewed during the
study emphasised the difficulties they faced in
involving their grassroots constituencies in the
complex, fast-moving debate on REDD+
regulation. It is therefore premature to assume
that the conditions exist for an agreement on
REDD+ that can claim the binding consent of
indigenous peoples.
This suggests that the negotiations, which Latour
envisages as being necessary to bring to an end the
‘war of the worlds’, may not yet have taken place,
for all the efforts to ensure indigenous
participation in REDD+ debates, and for all the
apparent convergence that has enabled Brazil to
move forward with a legislative framework that
seemingly has buy-in from all major stakeholders
including indigenous peoples. An approach to
REDD+ that is informed by climate justice
principles should aspire to reach a state of
equiproportionality – that is, a distribution of REDD+
benefits that follows equity criteria proportionally
based on the relevant aspects for which indigenous
peoples can be held responsible, reflecting a range
of factors including traditional knowledge and
sustainable forestry practices, and the community’s
historical contribution to forest and natural
resource conservation, alongside the amount of
carbon secured. As indigenous peoples legally
control a fifth of Brazilian Amazonia and hold
much of the knowledge which will be needed to
ensure sustainable management of the rest, failure
to arrive at agreements with them that are both
just and binding could critically undermine the
prospects for success of REDD+ in Brazil and
beyond. Achieving such agreements will require a
genuine negotiation, not one in which the
promoters of REDD proceed ‘by generously
offering to let the others in, on condition that they
leave at the door all that is dear to them: their
gods, their souls, their objects, their times and their
spaces, in short, their ontology’ (Latour 2002: 30).
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Notes
* Research for this article was carried out
through the Political Economy of Low Carbon
Climate Resilient Development project,
coordinated by IDS and funded by the UK
Department for International Development
(DFID). The views expressed here are the views
of the authors and do not represent the views or
policies of IDS, DFID, or the UK government.
1 For simplicity, REDD and REDD+ are used
interchangeably in the text.
2 In the aftermath of her successful
participation in the Nagoya and Cancun
meetings, Environment Minister, Izabella
Teixeira, signalled her Ministry’s
determination to play the leading role in
climate change policy, arguing strongly for
Brazil to align its strategies on climate change
and biodiversity conservation in order to
consolidate its global leadership position and
achieve maximum leverage in international
negotiations (speech at the University of
Brasília, 15 December 2010).
3 The ‘Legal Amazon’ is the political and
administrative definition of Brazilian
Amazonia, including the whole of eight states
(Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará,
Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins) and part of
a ninth (Maranhão).
4 For the full text of the ‘Palmas Declaration’,
see: www4.ap.gov.br/jsp/noticias/news.jsp?ref=
7982&dtDay=2009-06-26. The text of the
subsequent ‘Macapá Declaration’ can be
found at http://www4.ap.gov.br/download/
carta_de_macapa.pdf
5 Interviews with participants in ‘Indigenous
Peoples and REDD+’ workshop, Brasília,
15 September 2010.
6 IEB, the Instituto Internacional de Educação
do Brasil (International Institute of Education
in Brazil) was the local partner for this case
study research.
7 This is a transliteration of the Portuguese
term socioculturalista, which contrasts with the
term socioambientalista (socioenvironmentalist),
popular among ‘social green’ NGOs in Brazil
(cf. Clapp and Dauvergne 2005).
8 Latour cites Eduardo Viveiros de Castro,
whose ‘perspectival’ approach (2004) points
out that, whereas we see one nature that is
interpreted by many cultures, indigenous
‘multinaturalism’ presupposes that there are
actually many different natural worlds.
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